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RECENT FACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

a.

Since appellant

("Sine") filed his opening brief,

supersedeas surety and now co-debtor Jerry Sine died.

b.

Cottonwood

has continued

judgment.

Cottonwood

has

held

attempts to collect the

a trustee's

sale

on Sine's

personal residence, bidding in about $132,000, over and above
$14,000 homestead exemption.

a

This bid exceeds the amount of the

judgment held by Cottonwood ($98,706.20), more than retiring the
debt.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Cottonwood has offered no convincing argument as to why
attorney fees were proper without discovery or proper evidence.
The trial court has broad discretion, but must base any award on
the evidence before it.

In this case, where the fees far

exceed the judgment, there should have been findings based on
the appropriate factors.
The attorney fees should have stopped accruing when Sine
vacated

the premises, according

to both the lease and this

Court's prior decision in this case.
Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988).

Cottonwood Mall Co. v.

ARGUMENT

1.

Cottonwood had the burden of proof*

Yet it complains

that Sine has offered "no evidence in the record" to support the
argument that an evidenciary hearing should have been allowed
on

the

reasonableness

factual question).

of

attorney

Br. p. 5.

fees

(a procedural/

not

However Cottonwood, the party

seeking relief in the form of a judgment for attorney feesf has
the burden of proving the attorney fees are reasonable.

The

Cottonwood affidavit/ unencumbered as it is by detail/ is not
enough to withstand even the most muffled objection.

2.

The court's discretion is not limitless.

Cottonwood

tries to get the Court to uphold the attorney fee award by
citing

to

various

cases

which

grant

the

discretion as to the amount of attorney fees.
are

not

controlling

heref

where

trial

court

wide

Those authorities

the court would

discovery or require evidence on the issue at all.

not allow
Discretion

as to amount is an entirely separate question from the issue of
whether any record or findings support the award.
One case Cottonwood relies upon for its argument that the
court has broad discretion in considering attorney fee requests
is Regional Sales Agencyf Inc. v. Reichert/ 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah
App.

1989)

{copy

attached

in Appendix}.

In that

case an

attorney fee affidavit was submitted which was not objected tof
- 5 -

and which contained considerably more detail than Cottonwood's
in this case.

The court observed/ "An award of attorney fees

must be based on evidence in the record which supports the
award."

784 P.2d at 1215.
Even when an attorney fee affidavit is uncontroverted by

contrary testimonyf a trial judge "is not compelled to accept
the self-serving testimony of a party requesting attorney fees."
Id.; see alsof Beckstrom v. Beckstromy 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah
1978) {". . . the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to
accept such self-interested testimony whole cloth . . . " } .
Rather,
[then]

a judge

determine

circumstances."

a

"can evaluate the fees requested and

lesser

amount

is

reasonable

Regional Sales Agency, supraf

attached in Appendix}.

under

the

at 1215 (copy

Here such evaluation was impossible.

Since no evidenciary hearing or discovery was permitted/ all the
evidence was in the exclusive

control of Cottonwood and its

counsel.

shared

That

evidence

was

with

the

court

only

summarily.

3.
Cottonwood

The court did not consider the common law factors.
correctly points out that the attorney

should result from examination of several factors.
pp. 6-7.

They include:

a.

Difficulty of litigation/

b.

Efficiency of the attorneys/
- 6 -

fee award

Response Br.

c*

Reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the

d.

The fee customarily charged in the area for similar

casef

servicesf
e.

The

amount

involved

in the case and

the result

obtained/
f.

The

expertise

and

experience

of

the

attorneys

involved.
Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert/ 784 P.2d 1210
1989) (see Appendix}.
the trial

court

There is no indication in the record that

considered

these

Cottonwood has the burden of proof.
complains

that

(Utah App.

there

is

no

factors/

despite

the fact

Yetf ironically/ Cottonwood

evidence

on

which

to

base

a

determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Br. 6.
Cottonwood's affidavit makes noreal effort to address the
above six factors.

R. 1788-90/ Opening Br. App. D.

Cottonwood makes the following amazing statement:
evidence

that

these

factors

were

not

Instead/

"There is no

considered

by

Judge

Frederick in his determination that the amounts claimed by the
Cottonwood Mall Company were reasonable."
Attorney

fee

awards

must

be

properly

Response Br. p. 7.
substantiated.

Bangerter v. Poulton/ 663 P.2d 101f 103 (Utah 1983).

This must

be accomplished on the record/ not in a response brief.

- 7 -

Seef

Counsel's affidavit essentially

is a statement

that a

review of the records (most of which were not provided to the
trial court) "indicates" that the amount of fees claimed is
actually due.

R. 1788-90.

There is no attempt to claim that

the amount claimed is reasonablef or to inform the court of the
number of hours spent.

Id.

Cottonwood all but admits the

affidavit is inadequate:
The individual statements were not attached to the
Affidavit of counsel due to their volume and the
expense
involved
in copying
each
individual
statement for the seven years that the case had
been pending.
While it is true that the ledger
cards did not reflect the specific services
provided, the individual itemized statements for
each of those charges were available should the
trial court have desired to inspect them.
Response Br. p. 6 (emphasis added).
"It
adequate

follows,
evidence

therefore,
to

support

that
it

an

award

constitutes

discretion and must be overruled by this Court."

made
an

without
abuse

of

Paul Mueller

Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah
1982) .

Such

is the case

here.

And

the Amended

Judgment

contained no clue as to which factors, if any, were considered
in arriving at the amount awarded.

4.

No findings or conclusions were made.

This handicaps

considerably

the fees were

the Court
reasonable.

in determining whether

It is impossible, without findings and conclusions,

to tell whether the above factors were properly considered in
entering the judgment.
- 8 -

We have consistently encouraged trial courts to
make findings to explain the factors which they
considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee
award.
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215
(Utah App. 1988) (copy attached

in Appendix}; Bangerter, 663

P.2d at 103.
An award of attorney fees must generally be made
on the basis of findings of fact supported by the
evidence and appropriate conclusions of law.
Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985).
On a number of occasions, we have held that
attorneys fees should be awarded on the basis of
evidence and that findings of fact should be made
which support the award. See Bangerter v. Poulton,
Utah, 663 P.2d 100, 103 (1983); Hal Taylor
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., Utah~ 657 P.2d
743, 750-51 (1982); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache
Valley Dairy Association, Utah, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287
(1982).
Cabrera, supra, 694 P.2d at 624.

Copies of the Cabrera and

Mueller decisions are contained in the Appendix.

The Court in

Cabrera was faced with a judgment that did not contain separate
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

However, the defect

was held nonfatal since the order itself contained findings of
fact

and

legal

conclusion,

including

attorney fee award was reasonable.

the

finding

that

the

Id.

Here Cottonwood can look to no such fortuity to save its
defective

fee

award.

The

Amended

Judgment

appealed

from

(Opening Br. App. B, R. 1834-47) simply observes that this Court
in the prior

appeal granted Cottonwood's

- 9 -

cross appeal as to

attorney

fees.

Then, with

no

finding

as

to the basis or

reasonableness of the fees, or even a reference to whether they
are based upon affidavit, testimony or some other support, the
Amended Judgment merely list (after the principal and interest
on principal):
Attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff
in the pre-judgment phase of these
proceedings, with interest thereon at
the rate of 12% per annum in the amount
of:

$39,744.62

Post-judgment attorney's fees in the
amount of:

$6,641.58

R. 1835A, App. B to Opening Br.

There is no finding as to

reasonableness, either express or implied.

The trial judge

merely awarded Cottonwood the full amount claimed in its
affidavit.

The fact no findings were made, either separately or

as part of the judgment, is reason alone for reversal.

See,

Cabrera, supra, 694 P.2d at 624.
5.

Fees on appeal were not for actions by Cottonwood "to

secure possession of the premises", and should not have been
awarded.

Attorney fees are awarded in Utah only if authorized

by statute or contract.

Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699

P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985); see also, § 78-27-56, Utah Code (1981
[pre-1988 version]); § 78-27-56.5, Utah Code.
Here the award was based

upon contract

rights.

"If

provided for by contract, the award of attorney fees is allowed

- 10 -

only in accordance with the terms of the contract*"

Dixie State

Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added).
A trial court's

discretion does not permit it to ignore the

contract provisions.

Id. at 989-990.

"[A] party is entitled

only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of
contractual

rights

within

the

terms

of

their

agreement."

Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).
Cottonwood admits in its brief that the language which
supports an attorney fee award provides fees for "actions by the
lessor to secure possession of the premises at the expiration of
the lessee's term. . . ."

Response Br. p. 9.

Cottonwood

asserts that it is "[cllear

from the language of the lease

agreement that any action to enforce the terms of the lease is
covered by the attorney fee provision."

Id.

Yet it points to

no such language; only to that quoted above.
When possession was regained by Cottonwood very early in
the process, the right to attorney fees ended by the terms of
the very lease.
Sine will not reiterate here its observations about the
language of the initial decision of this court, awarding fees as
provided in paragraph 33 of the written lease, and costs on
appeal.

See, Opening Br. pp. 14-16.

Cottonwood counters them

by arguing, essentially, that the Court couldn't have meant what
it said.

Response Br. pp. 9-10.

- 11 -

Cottonwood cites to three cases for the proposition that
attorney fees are available on appealf and therefor the Court
must have meant something different.

Id. at p. 10.

Of course

there is no such general rule, attorney fees being available
only to the extent provided for in the contract, whether at
trial

or

on

appeal.

The

cases

Cottonwood

cites

for

its

misperceived rule are unhelpful for the following reasons:
Management Services v. Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406
(Utah 1980): Fees were provided in the contract for "pursuing
any

remedy

provided

hereunder

or

otherwise."

included an appeal to enforce the same contract.

They

In light of

the later cases, the rule in this case must be that fees are
available on appeal to the same extent as at trial, if provided
for by the contract.
Dixon

v.

Stoddard,

765

P.2d

879

(Utah

1988):

The

promissory note involved allowed attorney fees for "collection,
with or without suit. . . . "

Id. at 881.

Here fees were

allowed only to retake the leased premises.
Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989): Fees
are only available "in accordance with the terms of the parties1
agreement."

Id. at 836.

The Cobabe contract provided for fees

"in connection with litigation", which was held to include a
contested appeal.

No such language is found in the Cottonwood

lease.

- 12 -

Cottonwood did not include in its lease a broad attorney
fee clause like those in the above cases.

If it had, its fee

award would be less vulnerable to attack.

6.

Discovery and a hearing should have been permitted.

Ironically, Cottonwood supports its lack of proof by observing
that

although

the

attorney

fee

affidavit

and

its

sparse

attachments "did not reflect the specific services provided, the
individual itemized statements for each of those charges were
available should the trial court have desired to inspect them."
Response Br. p. 6.
Yet

Sine

objected

the

the proposed

judgment

and

discovery

the

affidavit

upon which

it was based, seeking

and a

hearing.

R. 1788-90.

To say the real evidence was "available"

to the trial court, but not to allow discovery or a hearing to
give the court and Sine access to it is error.

Those itemized

statements were exactly the kind of evidence Sine sought in
asking for discovery.
A hearing should be scheduled for attorney fees not fixed
at trial.

See, Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah

1985) (copy attached in Appendix}.

And in the prior appeal this

Court specifically remanded the matter "to the trial court to
determine and fix the amount of attorney fees and trial and
appeal costs to which plaintiff is entitled under paragraph 33
of the written lease."

Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d
- 13 -

499, 503 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added).

To "determine and fix" a

fee amount implies more than lifting a number from a cursory
affidavit,

despite

Sine's

objections,

without

finding

reasonableness, allowing discovery or holding a hearing.
Since Cottonwood failed to respond in a meaningful way to
Sine's arguments on discovery and the need for an evidenciary
hearing, those points are perhaps conceded.

7.

Interest on the attorney fees should not have been

awarded.

Yet

Cottonwood

$39,744.62

[pre-judgment

admits,

the

which accrued at the rate of 12%." Response Br. p. 8.

There is

no

such

awarding

attributable

of

interest

for

was

one-third
to

authority

fees]

"Over

retroactive

interest

on

an

unliquidated amount, especially at the rate of twelve percent.
Legal

interest would

liquidated amounts.

generally be ten percent

(but only on

See, § 15-1-1(2), Utah Code (1989).

CONCLUSION
Attorney fees about 140 percent of the principal due were
erroneously awarded.

There is no basis in the prior opinion of

this Court, or in the contract, for that kind of fee judgment.
A conclusory affidavit without reference to the factors
necessary to an attorney fee award, and not so much as asserting
that the fees are reasonable, provides insufficient basis for
the court to fix an amount.
- 14 -

Failure to make any findings of fact or conclusions of
law, refusal to allow discovery or a hearing further subject the
Amended Judgment to reversal.

Finally, the prior decision in

this same case limits the attorney fees to those incurred in
regaining possession of the premises.
The

case

should

be

reversed

and

remanded

for

a

determination of the proper amount of attorney fees to which
Cottonwood is entitled.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of July, 1990.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused an original and nine
copies of the foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of this
Court, by postage prepaid mail, and further that I caused four
copies thereof to be hand mailed, postage prepaid, on this
twenty-third day of July, 1990, to the following at the address
indicated.
Raymond Scott Berry
528 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX

i.

Cases

Cabrera v. Cotrell
694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985)
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association
657 P.2d 1279 (1982)
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert
784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989)

ii.

Statutes

15-1-1, Utah Code (1981)
78-27-56, Utah Code (1981) [pre-1988 version]
78-27-56, Utah Code (1981) [1988 version]
78-27-56.5, Utah Code (1981)
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up* VAClrlC

REPORTER :d

[111 Tht lessors argur tna: since the
iease die no: terminate in December 1979,
their carnages for failure ic pay me minimum royalty snouid inciuae tne period up
to Marcn, 19^0. the dale tney ciaim that
termination occurred. The lessors did not
file a cross-appeal and may no: now raise
that issue. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah
Venture No. 1, Utah, 645 P.2d 608. 613
(1982); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, Utah, 617 P.2d 700
(1980); Eliason v. Watts, Utah, 615 P.2d
427 (1980).
Affirmed.

Costs to respondents.

HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.

(O

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

John J. CABRERA, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.

Raiphine COTTRELL, aka Raiphine
Kennel, et ai., Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 18726.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 8, 1985.
On remand, the Third District Court,
Tooele County, David B. Dee, J., awarded
additional attorneys fees and costs for professional services rendered in the successful defense of an appeal arising out of an
action to enforce a uniform real estate contract. Appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) trial court
erred in awarding defendant additional attorneys fees for trial work when sole issue

rtavt Dec: or.r, tnr urttrmmatior. of attorney's feet for :n~ defensr uf t-*e appea.. (\l
amount of cam-re? ava r aec in a case coes
not piace a necessary iimr or the amount
of attorneys lees mat car, i>e awarded; (o
even tiiough. as a matter of form, it WOUJG
ha\e been preferable for trial court to have
entered separate findings of fact and conclusions of law m addition to order and
judgment for attorneys fees, the order and
judgment were not defective because they
were combined with findings and conclusions; and (4) charges for photocopies of
documents,
long-distance
telephone
charges, book fines, "and the like" incurred
in trial which were not presented to trial
court when trial costs were taxed, were not
properly awarded as appellate costs.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error 01207(3)
Trial court erred in awarding defendant additional attorneys fees for trial work
when sole issue after remand by Supreme
Court should have been only the determination of attorney fees for the defense of the
appeal.
2. Costs <S=199, 207
A party who is entitled to attorneys
fees and costs and fails to ask for all of
them in trial phase of case, or fails to
adduce adequate evidence in support of a
finding of reasonable attorneys fees,
waives any right to claim those fees later.
3. Costs <3=207, 208
An award of attorneys fees must generally be made on basis of findings of facts
supported by evidence and appropriate conclusions of law\
4. Costs <s=>199
It is not consistent with judicial economy to allow a party to apply for additional
fees for trial work, whether in an independent hearing, in a separate suit, or at a
hearing to determine an award of attorneys
fees for necessary appellate work.

5. Cost? e=!<*
Once a matter is htirai.ec;. or couW
nave been litigated, a parry may no: later
come into court to seek an addjcionai aware
oi attorneys fees.
6. Costs e=*208
An attorney will have to estimate fees
for work done on posttrial motions or ask
trial court to schedule a hearing on attorneys fees either after posttrial motions are
disposed of or after time for filing such
motions has expired.
7. Costs <3=>172
''Reasonable attorneys fees" are not
measured by what an attorney bills, nor is
the number of hours spent on a case determinative in computing fees; in determining
reasonableness of attorney's fees, a trial
judge may take into account provision in
Code of Professional Responsibility specifying elements that should be considered in
setting reasonable attorneys fees, to wit,
difficulty of litigation, efficiency of attorneys in presenting case, reasonableness of
number of hours spent on case, fee customarily charged in locality for similar services, amount involved in case and result attained, and expertise and experience of attorneys involved. Code of Prof.Resp.,
DR2-106.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
8. Costs <£=>172
Award of total attorneys fees of some
$19,000 in a contract dispute involving a
recovery of only $11,350 was not unreasonable.
9. Costs <s=»172
Amount of damages awarded in a case
does not place a necessary limit on the
amount of attorneys fees that can be
awarded.
10. Costs <s=>172
Attorneys fees, wrhen awarded as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of
legal right.

31. Cosi> c~20*
wouic nave Deer. LTeferaM?- i^-T ;r:«; four*'
10 have er^erec separate f:rjc::ig:; c: lac*.
ana conclusions of lav.- in adait-or; to o~at:
and judgment for attorneys fees, the orcer
and judgment were not defective because
tney were combined with findings ana conclusions.
12. Costs <s=*19S
Charges for photocopies of documents.
long-distance telephone charges, book
fines, "and the like" incurred in trial of
action to enforce a uniform real estate contract which were not presented to trial
court when trial costs were taxed, were not
properly awarded as appellate costs pursuant to Supreme Court's prior remittitur to
trial court for award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in defending
the appeal of the action.
13. Costs <3>264
No attorneys fees were to be awrarded
on appeal to Supreme Court, where appellant was prevailing party but had not
sought them.
D. Kendall Perkins, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment
awarding attorneys fees for professional
services rendered in the successful defense
of an appeal arising out of an action to
enforce a uniform real estate contract. In
Cabrera v. Cottrell, Utah, No. 17218 (filed
February 16, 1982) (unpublished), we remanded this case for the trial court to
award reasonable "attorney's fees and
costs incurred in defending this appeal,"
pursuant to Management Services Corp. v.
Development Associates, Utah, 617 P.2d
406 (1980). On remand, the district court
awrarded additional attorneys fees and
costs in the amount of $10,906.06. The
present appeal is from that judgment.

6 ^ PACIFIC REPORTER. 2cf
•e-lan': c",:-.irrj? trial int. trial cour*
Ti awarding attorneys fees for worn
:.; u- i>o?;-tr;a] motions, preparation of
j? of fact a:;c conclusion? of iaw. ana
:er and judgment, in addition to tee?
ed defending- the case on appeal.1
The inclusion of the attorneys fee?
.>rk done during: the trial phase of the
••/as error for two reasons. First, our
d was solely for the purpose of deter2 attorneys fees incurred as a neces•jart of handling the appeal. It did
rmit any other fees or expenses to be
ed against, the appellant.
>] Second, a party who is entitled to
eys fees and costs and fails to ask
1 of them in the trial phase of the
or fails to adduce adequate evidence
port of a finding of reasonable attorfees, waives any right to claim those
ater. An award of attorneys fees
generally be made on the basis of
gs of fact supported by the evidence
ppropriate conclusions of law. Ban• v. Poulton, Utah, 663 P.2d 100, 103
. Cf. Christensen v. Farmers InsurExchange, Utah, 669 P.2d 1236, 1239
; Girard v. Appleby, Utah, 660 P.2d
47 (1983); Hansen v. Gossett, Utah,
.2d 1258, 1261 (1979). It is not cont with judicial economy to allow a
to apply for additional fees for trial
whether in an independent hearing,
aparate suit, or at a hearing to determ award of attorneys fees for neces.ppeilate work. Once the matter is
ed, or could have been litigated, a
may not later come into court to seek
reliant claims that the amount attributable
ic trial phase of the case amounts to
0.85. It is clear from the trial court's findthat fees were awarded for the trial phase,
;ie amount is not stated. Since we have no
cript of the hearing, wc cannot determine
in fact the amount was. It will have to be
mined on the remand of this matter. The
ter apparently lost the transcript of the
ng on the attorneys fees matter, and that is
herefore, before us. The appellant might,
ver, have proceeded by way of an agreed
nenl of record on appeal pursuant to Rule
, Utah R.Civ.P., but did not do so.
2-106 provides:

SZRlty

an attorney wil: have to estimate fees for
work done on post-trial motions or ask the
thai court to schedule a hearing on attorneys fees either after post-trial motions artdisposed of or after the time for filing sue:?
motions has expired.
In the instant case, the trial court, after
the prior remand of this case, erred in
awarding the respondent additional attorneys fees for trial work when the sole issue
should have been only the determination of
attorneys fees for the defense of the appeal. Therefore, the fees awarded for trial
work must be deducted from the attorneys
fees awarded for the appeal.
Appellant also contends that the attorneys fees awrarded are too high and therefore unreasonable and that respondent is
entitled only to reasonable attorneys fees.
Appellant claims that the award of total
attorneys fees of some $19,000 in a contract dispute involving a recovery of only
$11,350 is per se unreasonable.
[7] Reasonable attorneys fees are not
measured by what an attorney actually
bills, nor is the number of hours spent on
the case determinative in computing fees.
In determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, a trial judge may take into account the provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility which specifies the elements that should be considered in setting
reasonable attorneys fees. Utah Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106.2 A
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides
in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly.

LANIER *. :V[>L"STJ":IAL iOM'S
e-ur: rr.av ror.ricer. amontr ot^er f^ctor^
me diificuiry o: the hti^ratjor.. tne iffjciercy of tne attorney? in presenting :ne cas.£.
me reasonableness of the number cf nours
spent or the case, me fee customarily
chanred m the iocaiity for similar services,
the amount involved in the case and tne
result attained, ana the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.
[8. 9] The total amount of the attorneys
fees awarded in this case cannot be said to
be unreasonable just because it is greater
than the amount recovered on the contract.
The amount of the damages awarded in a
case does not place a necessary limit on the
amount of attorneys fees that can be
awarded.
[10] Furthermore, contrary to appellant's contention that attorneys fees should
be determined on the basis of an equitable
standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as
allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of
legal right.

Or I T AH

contends tnat charge- for photocopier of
documents.
iong-distanee
te;eprior:e
charges, book fines, "ano the like" were.
incurred in tne trial of the case and were
not allowable on this appeal. Since they
were not presented to the trial court when
trial costs were taxed, they were not properly awarded as appellate costs pursuant to
our prior remittitur, apart from whether
they were taxable at all.
[13] Reversed and remanded to the trial
court to delete all attorneys fees and costs
not associated with the appeal of this matter. No attorneys fees are to be awarded
on this appeal since the appellant is the
prevailing party but has not sought them.
Costs to appellant.

[11] The appellant also contends that
the attorneys fees awarded were not supported by a finding of reasonableness. On
a number of occasions, we have held that
attorneys fees should be awarded on the
basis of evidence and that findings of fact
should be made which support the awrard.
See Bangerter v. Poulton, Utah, 663 P.2d
100, 103 (1983); Hal Taylor Associates v.
Unionamerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 743,
750-51 (1982); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache
Valley Dairy Association, Utah, 657 P.2d
1279, 1287 (1982). In the instant case, the
trial court did not enter separate findings
of fact and conclusions of law, at least
denominated as such. However, the order
and judgment did contain findings of fact
and legal conclusions, including the finding
that the award was reasonable. As a matter of form, it would have been preferable
for the trial court to have entered separate

HALL, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and results obtained.

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of
ihe lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Utah Rep 693-702 P.2d—4

Donald LANIER, Plaintiff.
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, Department of Employment
Security, Defendant.
No. 19862.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 11, 1985.
Claimant appealed from a decision of
the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
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where we quoted with approval the following' statements from Roberts on Frauds,
135:
To call anything a part performance before the existence of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be part performance is established, is an anticipation
of proof by assumption, ana gets rid of
the statute by jumping over it, for the
statute requires proof, and prescribes the
medium of proof.
We further stated that if possession by
the buyer is relied upon as part performance, it should be established without qualification or doubt. In the instant case there
was considerable dispute as to the identity
of the exact land possessed by the buyers.
Evidence was presented that the sellers had
occupied the 20 acres adjacent to the home
and built improvements on it, yet at other
times had fenced and occupied the 20 acres
where the oil well was located. The buyers,
who claim that the 20 acres reserved by the
sellers was near the home, readily admit
that they cut the hay from this ground, and
that they made no objection when the sellers allowed oil drilling equipment upon the
20 acres down in the field. This being a
case at equity where we are permitted to
review the facts as well as the law, I am
compelled to conclude that the parol evidence offered to prove the identity of the
420 acres possessed by the buyers was anything but clear and definite. I would deny
the buyers specific performance.
I concede that the recent decision of Reed
v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980) contains broad language (quoted in the majority opinion) which seemingly might authorize the admission of parol testimony in the
instant case. That case, however, did not
purport to overrule any prior decision of
this Court and I would limit the broad
language to the facts of that case, viz.,
there was no real dispute as to what property the parties intended to sell or buy .since
the seller had sold to others all his property
at that address except the unit claimed by
the plaintiff buyer.
I am in accord with an observation made
by Justice Frick in Adams v. Manning, 46
Utah at 86, 148 P. at 466, where he said:

It has, however, always seemed to tne
writer that unless the courts are very
careful in tne admission of paro; evioenct
and in acting upon tne mere innerer;
probabilities as such appear tc tne cou^tf
they will. ir. equiu. enforce paro cortracts which are clear!) within tm statute as readily as courts of law enforce a:
other contracts and we thus entirely fitter away the statute of frauds.
See the dissenting opinion of Justice Wilkins in Stauffer v. Call, Utah, 589 P.2d 1219
(1979). I can only add that what the trial
court did here flies in the face of the purpose of the statute of frauds. If the statute served no purpose, then the Legislature
should repeal it, but this Court should not
make inroads upon it to achieve our sense
of justice in a given case.

PAUL MUELLER COMPANY, a Missouri
corporation, and Dahle Construction, a
Utah partnership, Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
v.
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION,
a Utah agricultural cooperative corporation, Defendant, Respondent and CrossAppellant.
PAUL MUELLER COMPANY, a Missouri
Corporation, and Dahle Construction
Company, a Utah partnership, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION,
a Utah agricultural cooperative corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
Nos. 17743, 17745.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 6, 1982.
Subcontractors appealed from a judgment of the First District Court, Cache

1280

Utah

657 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES

County, VeNoy Chnstoffersen, J., refusing
to enforce their claimed mechanics' hens
against owner on wney drying equipment
and owner cross-appealed from denial of its
counterclaim relating to defective manufacture and installation of the equipment
The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that
(1) evidence did not compel finding that
whey dryer was annexed to owner's property for mechanics' hen purposes; (2) whey
drying equipment was not adapted to owner's property for mechanics' lien purposes;
(3) refusal to recognize lien in subcontractor
against manlift and walkways installed in
owner's building was not error; (4) subcontractors did not owe owner a manufacturer's duty of reasonable care to guard
against economic loss to users of its product; (5) even if subcontractors had breached duty towards owner by defectively constructing drying chamber, owmer had failed
to prove causation and damages and therefore was not entitled to recover; and (6)
statement of owner's counsel at posttnal
hearing did not provide adequate evidentiary basis for equal apportionment of attorney fee award between subcontractors.
Remanded.

1. Mechanics' Liens <s=>30
Mere physical attachment to building
does not necessarily confer fixture status
upon what would otherwise constitute personal property for mechanics' lien purposes,
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-14.
2. Mechanics' Liens <s=>281(l)
Evidence did not compel finding that
whey dryer, which was attached to owner's
building by means of ducts, wiring and
welding and partially bolted into cement
floor, was annexed to owner's property for
mechanics' lien purposes. U.C.A.1953, 142-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-1-4.
3. Mechanics' Liens <s=>32
"Adaptation" of equipment to property
for mechanics' lien purposes occurs when

personal property is integrated inr> re^
p^opem m furtnerance of specifK pan>is.~
to vhicr rea> property has Deer, devotee
e.g.. when owner of brief kiln integrate?
furnace into kun U C.A 1953. 14-Z-l. : , 2-2. 38-1-3. 35-1-i
See publication Words and Phrases
for otner judicial constructions ana
definitions
4. Mechanics* Liens <s=>32
Equipment is not "adapted" to use of
real property for mechanics' lien purposes
where real property itself is adaptable to
multiple uses and where it is solely the
presence of the equipment itself which determines purpose served b) real property.
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-14.
5. Mechanics' Liens <s=>32
Where real property m question consisted of prefabricated metal building with
concrete floor, manlift, walkways and supporting structures, building had no characteristics which in any way limited its use to
whey drying, building did not exist as whey
drying "plant" prior to owner's acquisition
of whey drying equipment in question, and
owner connected equipment to building in
manner which allowed removal of equipment without significant damage to building, building was suitable for multiple uses
rather than for single use corresponding to
function of whey drying equipment and
therefore equipment was not "adapted" to
building for mechanics' lien purposes. U.C.
A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-3, 38-1-4.
6. Mechanics' Liens <s=>29
Refusal to recognize lien in subcontractor against manlift and walkways installed
in owner's building was not error, notwithstanding that such items were not found to
be personal property, where subcontractor
presented no evidence as to percentage of
total labor expended towards construction
of manlift and walkways other than rough
guess by company's managing partner, nor
did subcontractor attempt to establish percentage of current balance due which repre-
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sented such labor, and evidence snowed thfct
suDcontractor recenec partial payment fo"
its mstailatior laoor prior to genera, cortractor's ban>:ruptc\ and tnat manhft v>m>
first item installed t>\ subcontractor U.C
A.1953. 14-2-1, 14-2-2, 38-1-8, 38-1-4
7. Negligence <s=»2
Subcontractors, with whom general
contractor respectively contracted to construct whey drying cylinders, a drying
chamber and other parts of whey drying
system and to assemble and install system,
who provided their products and services to
presumably knowledgeable contractor in accordance with detailed contract specifications, who did not conceal alleged defects in
drying chamber from contractor, and who
were in no better position than contractor
to anticipate possible economic consequences of defects, did not owe owner a
manufacturer's duty of reasonable care to
guard against economic loss to users of its
product, and contractor bore responsibility
for correction of defects.
8. Negligence <s=»103
Even if subcontractors, with whom
general contractor respectively contracted
to construct whey drying cylinders, drying
chamber and other parts of whey drying
system and to assemble and install system,
had breached duty towards owner by defectively constructing drying chamber, where
evidence showed no actual loss to owner's
business resulting from alleged defects, and
owner's brief contained no discussion concerning either causation or damages, owner
had failed to prove causation and damage
and could not recover for alleged breach.
9. Appeal and Error <s=>984(5)
Supreme Court's policy is to accord
great deference to discretionary conclusions
of trial court regarding attorney fees.
10. Costs «=> 207
Evidentiary basis is fundamental requirement for establishing award of attorney fees
Utah Rep 656 659

P2d~i0

11. Costs e=*207
Av%ard of a t t o n ^ fees maot withou4
aaecuate evidence to suDtrrt it constitute.anase of discretion ana must Dt o\eyrJL^
0} Supreme Court
12. Mechanics' Liens e=»310(3/
Statement of owner's coanse. at posttrial hearing m mechanics' hen actior that
he had spent equal time defending Doth of
subcontractors' claims did not provide adequate evidentiary basis for equal apportionment of award of attorney fees to owner
between subcontractors where there was no
indication that statement was derived from
stipulated billing records, nor from any other competent evidentiary source
13. Mechanics' Liens s=>310(3)
In mechanics' hen action against owner
who asserted counterclaim, only those billable hours attributable to owner's defense of
mam causes of action were compensable
pursuant to attorney fee award.
14. Mechanics' Liens c=>310(3)
Award of $17,000 in attorney fees to
owner, who asserted counterclaim against
subcontractors in mechanics' lien action
against him, was derived from sound evidentiary basis where counterclaim was unsuccessful and trial court had sufficient information m billing records to enable it to
separate counterclaim hours from those
spent in defense of mam causes of action.

Bruce L. Jorgensen, Gary N. Anderson
and Gordon J Low, Logan, for plaintiffs,
appellants and cross-respondents.
B.H. Harris, George W. Preston and Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, for defendant,
respondent and cross-appellant
HALL, Chief Justice.
Appellants Paul Mueller Company (Mueller) and Dahle Construction Company
(Dahle) appeal from the trial court's refusal
to enforce their claimed mechanic's hens
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against respondent Cache Valley Dairy Association on whey drying equipment possessed by the latter. Respondent in turn,
cross-appeals from thai court's denial of its
counterclaim relating to defective manufacture and installation of the equipment by
appellants. In addition, appellants and respondent all contest the amount of attorney
fees awarded by the court to respondent
I. Appellants' Claim
In 1978, respondent contracted with
Maxum Corporation (Maxum), a Delaware
firm, for the installation of a whey drying
system on respondent's premises. Maxum
subcontracted with appellant Mueller to
construct four large drying cylinders, a drying chamber and other parts of the system
and with appellant Dahle to assemble and
install the system. In order to house the
whey drying equipment, respondent engaged a separate contractor to pour a cement foundation and to assemble a fourstory prefabricated metal building thereon.
Following the manufacture by Mueller of
the parts ordered by Maxum, Dahle assembled the large drying chamber and cylinders
and moved them into the building. Dahle
also constructed a manlift and walkwrays
within the building and installed various
ducts, frameworks and other equipment in
order to connect parts of the system to each
other and to the building.
After respondent had paid Maxum in full
for the drying system, Maxum declared
bankruptcy, leaving unpaid balances owing
to both Mueller and Dahle. Mueller and
Dahle each filed a notice of lien upon the
whey drying equipment under the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, §§ 38-1-3 and 38-14. The former statute states:
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration,
or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in
any manner . . . shall have a lien upon
the property upon or concerning which
they have rendered service, performed la-

bor or furnisfteo or rented material?, or
equipment for the value of trie service
renaered. labor performed or materials or
equipment furnished or rented r>y each
respectively, whether at the instance of
the owner or any other person acting by
his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise.
Appellants then filed this action against
respondent to foreclose the alleged liens,
claiming also that respondent should bear
liability for the debts of its contractor under the provisions of U.C.A., 1953v §§ 142-1 and 14-2-2. Those statutes provide,
respectively, as follows:
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or
more, for the construction, addition to, or
alteration or repair of, any building,
structure or improvement upon land
shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a
bond in a sum equal to the contract price,
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the
contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed under
the contract. Such bond shall run to the
owner and to all other persons as their
interest may appear; and any person who
has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building, structure or improvement, payment for which
has not been made, shall have a direct
right of action against the sureties upon
such bond for the reasonable value of the
materials furnished or labor performed,
not exceeding, however, in any case the
prices agreed upon . . . . [Emphasis added.]
Any person subject to the provisions of
this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such
good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit
the same, as herein required, shall be
personally liable to all persons who have
furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in
any case the prices agreed upon.
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The trial court found that the equipment
manufactured by Mueller and much of the
equipment installed by Dahle constituted
personal property rather than improvements to realty as required b\ §§ 14-2-1
and 38-1-4. and that appellants therefore
held no statutory liens upon the equipment
Although tne court found tne manhft an"
walkways constructed b> Dahle to oe futures to which a statutory hen might app'}.
the court refused to recognize such a hen on
the part of Dahie. finding no substantial
evidence to indicate what percentage of
Maxum's debt to Dahle represented work
on the latter items and what percentage
represented assembly of the items found to
be personal property. Appellants contend
that the evidence clearly preponderates
against these findings, requiring instead a
finding that all of the whey drying equipment constituted "structure^] or improvements] upon land" subject to the statutory
liens.
In distinguishing between real and personal property for statutory lien purposes,
this Court has adopted a tripartite test,
giving consideration to the following factors:
(1) [the] manner in which the item is
attached or annexed to realty; (2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular
use of the realty; and (3) the intention of
the annexor to make an item a permanent part of the realty.1
The trial court referred to the above
three factors in determining the lien status
of respondent's equipment, finding:
After the examination [of] the manner
in which the equipment was attached,
and the particular use of the machinery
and the intent of the parties, the Court
determines the said equipment to be personalty . . . .
We therefore review the evidence presented
concerning the elements of annexation, ad1. State v. Papamkolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427
P.2d 749, 751 (1967).
2. Del Porto v. Nicolo, Utah, 495 P.2d 811
(1972).

aptation anG intent in oraer to oetermme
whether such evidence supports the triai
court's findings. Appellants and respondent aeree that if. and onh if. the evidence
"cieam preponderates aga..nst tne court ^
findings,, this Court 'must o\erru,t thosfindings
A

Annexation

[1.2] The evidence show:? that tne wre>
drying equipment w&t atiachec to tne
building b\ means of oucu wiring anc
welding and that some eoupmen: was boUeo into the cement floor However, mere
physical attachment to a building does net
necessarily confer fixture status upon what
would otherwise constitute personal property.3 In the present case, respondent
presented evidence to show that most of the
ducts and wires connecting equipment to
the metal building consisted of detachable
sections designed for easy removal and that
respondent requested the attachment of
lifting lugs to the larger pieces of equipment so that they could be more easily
lifted and transported from the building.
The trial court, having personally inspected
the whey drying equipment in the presence
of counsel, found that the bolts securing
machinery to the floor could be disconnected easily and that equipment could be removed without damage to the building.
The evidence therefore did not compel a
finding that the whey dryer was annexed to
respondent's property.
B. Adaptation
[3,4] Appellants claim that the whey
drying equipment wTas adapted to respondent's property by virtue of the fact that
the building housing the equipment was
used solely for whey drying. Appellants
misinterpret the concept of adaptation as
used by courts in determining the character
of property. Adaptation occurs when per3. Workman v Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 P 1033
(1928), King Brothers, Inc v. Utah Dry Kiln
Co, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P 2d 254 (1962)
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sonal property is integrated into real property in furtherance of a specific ouroose U
which the real property has Deen devotea
as, for example, when the owner of a brick
kiln integrates a furnace into tne kiln 4
Eauipment is not "adapted" to the use of
real property where the real property itself
is adaptable to multiple uses and where it is
solely the presence of the equipment itself
which determines the purpose served by the
real property.
[5] In the present case, the real property in question consists of a prefabricated
metal building with a concrete floor, a manlift, walkways and supporting structures.
The building itself has no characteristics
which in any way limit its use to whey
drying, nor did it exist as a whey drying
"plant" prior to respondent's acquisition of
the equipment in question. As noted above,
respondent connected the equipment to the
building in a manner which allows removal
of the equipment without significant damage to the building. The trial court, in its
findings, observed:
The whey drying equipment is not one
[sic] that was made or constructed for the
particular use of this building but was
suitable for any other plant of this nature. This building was constructed for
and adapted to house this machinery
much in the same way that many buildings are constructed to house farm machinery, or fabricated machinery which
remain personalty. That machinery in
question here has nothing to do with
servicing the building such as a furnace
and duct work do a house for heating
purposes.
The court correctly found respondent's
building to be suitable for multiple uses
rather than for a single use corresponding
to the function of the whey drying equipment.
4. King Brothers, Inc v Utah Dry Kiln Co,
supra, n. 3. See Progress Press-Brick & Machine Co v Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151
Mo. 501, 52 SW. 401 (1899).
5. King Brothers Inc v. Utah Dry Kiln Co,
supra, n. 3

C

Intention of tnt re<x propertv owner

The parties arret: that of int three elements to oe considerec IF determining
whether the wne\ a*yer i? rea* o r personal
property, the most important is intention
Concerning this element, this Cour: has
stated
In order to quanfj unaer these [mechanic's hen] statutes it is necessar\ that
there must be annexation to the land
and this must have been done with the
intention of making [the personal property] a permanent part thereof. [Emphasis
added.] 5
Factors to be considered m determining
whether such an intention exists include
annexation and adaptation, discussed above,
as well as
the relation and situation of the party
making the annexation, the policy of the
law in relation thereto, the structure and
mode of the annexation, and the purpose
or use for which the annexation has been
made.6
In the present case, testimony by respondent's general manager tends to show an
absence of intent on the part of respondent
to incorporate the whey drying equipment
into its real property
[T]he building was designed specifically
so that we could house that piece of
equipment, so that we could get that
piece of equipment into the building, so
that we could get that piece of equipment
out of the building without any particular
problem if at some time down the line in
the future we decided that the economies
in whey drying justified us going into
some other drying operation.
*
*
*
*
*
*
The reason we chose a metal building
was because of its versatility. It's a con6. Builders Appliance Supply Co v AR John
Construction Co, 253 Or 582, 455 P2d 615
(1969)
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struction which is bolted together, it's
very easily unbolted, and it provides maximum flexibility and the moving m and
moving out of equipment
Testimony by a salesman of dairy equipment showed that it is common practice to
transport used whey drying equipment
from its original location for purposes of
sale or use in another locality.
Q Do you have an opinion as to
whether or not those tanks could be
moved from Cache Valley Dairy to another place?
A Certainly they could be moved.
Q And are they a merchantable type
item that might be purchased by some
other individual in the same business
somewhere else in the country?
A Yes.
Q Would there be a problem with selling that type of equipment?
A Not very, no.
Q Is there a demand for that type of
equipment?
A You bet.

. . . I particularly am not adaptable to
whey drying equipment, but I'm familiar
with it and it's bought and sold, used and
new.
Q And I assume when it's bought and
sold it has to change places and locations
and everything?
A Oh, yes.
Respondent's attachment of lifting lugs to
the whey drying cylinders and its provision
for relatively easy disconnection of the
equipment also tend to show an absence of
intention to annex the equipment.
In addition to the above structural and
testimonial evidence as to the character of
respondent's equipment, the trial court admitted as evidence a lease agreement between respondent and First Security Leasing Company by which respondent had acquired the whey drying equipment. In that
agreement, respondent and First Security

Leasing Compam characterize UK wne;
drying equipment as persona1 prot>er^
AppellanU compiain thai me provisions of
the agreement are irreievart to tnc preser:
issue and that the tna, court snou": n<>v
ha\e admitted the agreement Appellant
claim that by doing so, thai court imposed
upon appellants the terms of a contract to
which they were not parties
The findings of the trial court do not
indicate that the characterization of respondent's property contained m the lease
agreement in any way influenced the
court's own decision concerning the nature
of the property Even assuming that the
court did consider provisions of the lease as
evidence, the lease constituted only one of
many items of evidence presented on the
issue of respondent's intent. If the court
had excluded the lease from other such
evidence, that which remained still would
not preponderate against that court's findings. Therefore, we need not consider the
propriety of the court's admission of the
lease.
[6] Appellant Dahle claims that because
the trial court did not find the manlift and
walkwrays to be personal property, the court
should have enforced a lien against these
items for a portion of the total balance
owed to Dahle. However, Dahle presented
no evidence as to wThat percentage of its
total labor had been expended towards construction of the manlift and walkways other than a rough guess by the company's
managing partner Nor did Dahle attempt
to establish the percentage of its current
balance due which represented such labor.
The evidence shows that Dahle received
partial payment for its installation labor
prior to Maxum's bankruptcy and that the
manlift was the first item installed by
Dahle. The trial court reasonably may
have concluded that the portion of Dahle's
labor for which early payment was made
included much or all of the labor incurred in
construction of the items which it determined to be fixtures. The court therefore
did not err in refusing to recognize in Dahle
a lien against these items
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II. Respondent's Counterclaim
Respondent counterclaimed against each
appellant. Respondent alleged that Dahie
had improperly welded tne drying chamber
and that Mueller had omitted certain vertical joining flanges from the chamber, decreasing its structural integrity. Claiming
that these and other defects rendered the
chamber worthless, respondent requested
damages from appellants under theories of
negligence, breach of contract and slander
of title. The trial court denied respondent's
counterclaim.

Having contracted directly with Maxum
and knowing of MaxumV close supervisor
of the entire installation procebs. apnellanb
had reasor to expect that Maxum WOUJ^
proieci respondent s interest by onservm*:
and obtaining correction of obvious defects
The trial court correctly found that Maxum
bore responsibility for correction o; sucr
defects.

[8] Even if appellants had breached a
duty towards respondent by defectively
constructing the drying chamber, the evidence would not supp>ort recovery by reIn appealing the denial of its counter- spondent in the absence of a showing that
claim, respondent relies solely on negligence the alleged defects actually caused damages
theory, contending that appellants owed to to respondent. Although respondent in its
it a manufacturer's duty of due care. Re- brief alleges that the drying chamber fails
spondent claims that a manufacturer must to meet U.S.D.A. standards and that it has
exercise care not only to guard against inju- no value, testimony shows that it was using
ry to foreseeable users of its product, but the chamber and other drying equipment at
also to protect such users from economic the time of trial. The evidence shows no
loss attributable to nondangerous defects in actual loss to respondent's business resultthe product. In support of this proposition, ing from the alleged defects and responrespondent cites W.R.H. v. Economy Build- dent's brief contains no discussion whatsoers Supply,1 a case decided after issuance of ever concerning either causation or damthe trial court's final order. Respondent ages. We hold that respondent has shown
urges this Court to consider that order in neither a duty on the part of appellants to
light of the W.R.H. decision.
protect it against nondangerous, nonconcealed defects in the drying chamber nor the
[7] Assuming, arguendo, that the additional elements of causation and damW.R.H. case established a duty of reasona- ages. The trial court therefore correctly
ble care on the part of a manufacturer to denied respondent's counterclaim.
guard against economic loss to users of its
product, such a duty wrould not apply to
III. Attorney Fees
appellants in the present case. Appellants
The trial court awarded to respondent
are not "manufacturers*' comparable to the
manufacturer in the W.R.H. case. While $17,000 in attorney fees, dividing liability
the latter manufactured products destined for this amount equally between appellants.
for retail sale to unknown and potentially Although appellants concede that the
inexperienced purchasers, appellants pro- amount of the award is reasonable, appelvided their products and services to a pre- lant Dahie contests the equal apportionsumably knowledgeable contractor in ac- ment of that award between itself and apcordance with detailed contract specifica- pellant Mueller. Dahle asserts that because
tions. Appellants in no way concealed the of the fact that Mueller asserted a signifialleged defects in the drying chamber from cantly larger claim on respondent's properMaxum and were in no better position to ty than did Dahle, Mueller's responsibility
anticipate possible economic consequences for attorney fees should be proportionately
of such defects than was Maxum itself. greater than that of Dahle. Dahle claims
7. Utah, 633 P.2d 42 (1981).
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that the court had no evidentiary basis upon
which to divide liability equally between
appellants.
At the post-trial hearing concerning the
court's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, counsel for Dahie pointed
out that the court had failed to apportion
liability for the $17,000 award, whereupon
the court entertained suggestions from the
various counsel as to the proper method of
apportionment. Dahie'? counsel proposed
that each plaintiff be assessed an amount, in
proportion to its original claim against respondent. The court's decision to divide the
liability equally followed a statement by
counsel for respondent that he had spent
equal time defending both claims. Dahle
contends that this statement alone constituted an inadequate basis upon which to
make that decision.
[9] It is this Court's policy to accord
great deference to the discretionary conclusions of the trial court regarding attorney
fees. "In the absence of abuse of discretion, the amount of the awrard by the district court will not be disturbed."8 However, the long-standing rule regarding the
establishment of attorney fees is as was
discussed and articulated in the case of Mason v. Mason.9 "It is well established that
to justify a finding of a reasonable attorney's fee, there must be evidence in support
of that finding/' (Emphasis added.)
A more recent, and somew?hat more emphatic declaration of this rule was made in
the case of Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker
Motor Co.10 In Freed, a substantial attorney fee award was included in the trial
court's order of summary judgment. On
review, this Court held:
Even if there were no disputed issue of
material fact, the summary judgment
8. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Utah, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (1982).

could not award an attorney's fee without
a stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted affidavit, or evidence given a= to
the value thereof.
Id. at 1040.
[10.11] A similar application of this rule
is found in the case of Richards v. HOQSORU
which is one of several cases cited a^ authority for the Freed decision. There, the
Court stated: "This Court has on numerousoccasions held that attorney's fee? cannot
be allowed unless there is evidence to support them." Id. at 1046. It is beyond dispute that an evidentiary basis is a fundamental requirement for establishing an
award of attorney fees. It follows, therefore, that an award made without adequate
evidence to support it constitutes an abuse
of discretion and must be overruled by this
Court.
In this case, the parties by stipulation
presented detailed billing records to the
court as the evidentiary basis upon which
the court could determine a reasonable attorney fee award for the prevailing party.
The record indicates, however, that the
court's decision to apportion the liability
equally was not based on this evidence, but
rather was derived wholly from the post-trial statement of counsel.
[12] In the case of Sharp v. Hui Wahine,
Inc.}2 a mortgagee was denied attorney
fees after successfully prosecuting a foreclosure suit, because counsel had not offered evidence other than his opinion to
support the award he sought. The Hawaii
Supreme Court stated:
Counsel submitted neither evidence of the
customary charges of the Bar nor any
expert testimony other than their own
self-serving opinions to show the reasonableness of their fees. As has been aptly
11. 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971).
See also, Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v.
Anderson, 20 Utah 2d 104, 433 P.2d 608 (1967).

9. 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730, 733 (1945).
12. Hawaii, 413 P.2d 242 (1966).
10. Utah, 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1975).
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stated: ". . . while the mortgagee's attorney may not be an incompetent witness, it is not good practice to make an
award [of an attorney fee] predicated
only on his opinion." 59 C.J.S. Mortgages
§ 812e(2). at 1554.
Id. at 246, 247. The foregoing ruling is in
accord with the evidentiary rule set forth
by this Court in the Mason. Freed and Richards cases, supra. The statement of respondents' counsel at the post-trial hearing did
not provide an adequate evidentiary basis
for the trial court's apportionment ruling.
There was no indication that the statement
was derived from the stipulated billing records, nor from any other competent evidentiary source. It was, therefore, an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to rely on that
statement to support its apportionment decision.
Counsel for respondent claims that although the trial court may have properly
apportioned its attorney fee award, the
amount of that award is inadequate. Detailed billing records prepared by respondent's counsel show a total of 693 billable
hours spent in defense against appellants'
claims and in prosecution of respondent's
counterclaim, for which counsel billed $47,000. The lower court awarded to respondent $17,000 in attorney fees. Respondent
contends that this award represents only
36% of the actual attorney fees incurred,
that it is grossly inadequate and that it does
not constitute a reasonable attorney fee.
In response, appellants point out that a
large measure of the billable hours of respondent's counsel are attributable to his
prosecution of the counterclaim. Because
the counterclaim was unsuccessful, the
hours spent in the prosecution thereof are
noncompensable. Appellants' reasoning is
supported by this Court's recent decision in
the case of Utah Farm Production Credit
Association v. CoxP There, the Court refused to award attorney fees altogether,
because the prevailing plaintiff failed to
13. Utah, 627 P.2d 62 (1981).

provide enougn proof to enable the court to
distinguish the portion of plaintiff? fees
spent in prosecuting the complaint from the
portion spent in defending tne counterclaim. The Court, reiving upon already established principles, stated:
In the case of Szubbs v. Heniwertj1^ this
Court ruled that the plaintiff was not
entitled to reimbursement for fees he had
incurred in defending a counterclaim in a
foreclosure action. A party is therefore
entitled only to those fees resulting from
its principal cause of action for which
there is a contractual (or statutory) obligation for attorney's fees.
[13,14] Accordingly, only those billable
hours attributable to respondent's defense
of the main causes of action were compensable. In contrast to the situation in the
Cox case, the trial court in the present case
had sufficient information before it in the
billing records to enable it to separate the
counterclaim hours from those spent in defense of the main causes of action. The
award of $17,000 was, therefore, derived
from a sound evidentiary basis, and will not
be disturbed by this Court on appeal.
In viewr of the foregoing, the matter of
attorney fees is remanded for the limited
purpose of determining, either from the
billing records or from additional evidence,
a reasonable and equitable apportionment
between appellants of liability for the $17,000 award.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, J J., concur.

O E KEYNUMBERSYSUM

14. Utah, 567 P.2d 16S (1977).

1210

^ h

"S4 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES

home* defendant did not insist on examining the mother ^nen sne reportec vaginal
bleeding to aetermme if premature Dirth
was liKeiy or if so, wnat precautions snoulo
be taKen to minimize tne iiKelihood of pre
mature birth defenaan; diagnosed tne infant after birth as having Respirator}' Distress Syndrome: defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant m a way which relieved
the symptoms but would not alleviate the
condition itself; defendant minimized the
seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy
and Joanne; three of the ten children he
had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant could die from the
disease and that the disease was progressive; defendant could not himself admit the
infant into a hospital because he lacked
malpractice insurance, so would have to
call another physician or have the infant
admitted through an emergency room facility; Ivy testified that defendant only told
her to watch the infant for changes in his
temperature, color and respiration, without
advising her as to the degree of change
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he
warn her or Joanne that death could result
from the disease; and defendant left the
infant in the care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence
which would indicate that defendant should
not have been aware that a substantial risk
existed. However, the existence of conflicting evidence, by itself, does not justify
reversal of a jury verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah CtApp.
1989). The jury has been through the arduous task of listening to and assessing the
evidence presented in this most difficult
case, and I do not think that we should
appropriately substitute our judgment for
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury
believed he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he
should have known the risks. I do not find
the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive," as
do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I
would conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant should have been aware that a sub-

stantia* and unjustified r*sh of aeatr exi^tea ana to convict defendant cf negligent
homicide as a result

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a
Utah corporation. Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Roland W. REICHERT, Defendant,
Respondent, and Cross-Appellant.
No. 88024G-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 24, 1989.
Employer brought action against salesman for breach of noncompetition agreement. After denying salesman's motion to
amend counterclaim, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake Count}7, Pat B. Brian, J.,
entered judgment on jury verdict awarding
slightly less than $800 in damages and
awarded contractual attorney fees in
amount of $7,500 rather than almost $27,000 that had been sought. Parties appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held
that: (1) salesman bore burden of proving
that there was no reasonable relationship
between actual damages suffered by employer as result of his breach and amount
employer would collect under agreement's
liquidated damages provision; (2) liquidated damages provision was not unreasonable as a matter of law; (3) unexplained
reduction of attorney fees sought could not
stand on appeal; and (4) motion to amend
counterclaim was properly denied.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
1. Damages @=>163(3)
In context of noncompetition agreement's liquidated damages provision, sales-

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY. INC. v.
mar. vno orea^r-ec agreement rvore ry^r-cei.of snowing iha; no carnages were suffered
or that there was no reasonable relationship between actual damages suffered by
employer and amount employer would collect under agreement, and burden should
not have been placed on employer to establish that provision provided fair compensation and that damages that would be
awarded under provision were reasonably
related to its actual damages.
2. Damages G=78(3)

Noncompetition agreement's liquidated
damages provision, pursuant to which
salesman would hold commissions earned
during three years following termination of
employment in trust if he continued to represent manufacturers he had previously
represented on employer's behalf. wras not
unreasonable as a matter of law even
though it did not reflect expenses incurred
by salesmen in earning such commissions.
3. Costs <s=*l94.32
Where parties to contract agree that
attorney fees will be awarded, such attorney fee provision should ordinarily be enforced by court.
4. Costs <3=>194.18, 208
Award entered under contractual attorney fee provision could not stand on
appeal where it reflected amount considerably less than that established by unrebutted evidence and where there were no findings explaining trial court's reduction.
5. Appeal and Error <3=>959(1)
In reviewing grant or denial of motion
to amend, court will look to timeliness of
motion, justification given by movant for
delay, and resulting prejudice nonmovant.
6. Pleading <s=>262
Motion to amend counterclaim filed
three years after commencement of litigation, following extensive discovery, was
properly denied despite movant's contention that issues presented by motion did not
substantially vary issues and evidence already involved; issues raised by complaint
were limited to validity of a contract, while
counterclaim interjected movant's entitlement to commissions under that contract,
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saitrs figures; moreover n'-.otijr. T-vc: mscr
day before trial was scnecu.ee. arc m< justification was offered for ae;ay. Rules Civ.
Proc. Rule IS'.e1
Bryce E. Roe. Salt Lake City. for plaintiff, appellant and cros=-responde:.:
E.K. Fankhauser. Sak Lane City, for defendant, respondent anc cross-appeiiant.
Before BENCH. EILLINGS a:;a
GREENWOOD, J J.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. ("Regional")
appeals from a jury7 verdict awarding it
$792.18 in damages as a result of cross-appellant Roland Reichert's ("Mr. Reichert")
breach of a non-competition agreement
with Regional, his former employer. Regional also appeals the trial court's reduction of its attorney fees which Regional
claims were provided for by the parties'
written contract and reasonably incurred in
prosecuting this action.
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's denial of his attempt to amend his counterclaim to add a claim for unpaid commissions and salary. We reverse and remand
in part, and affirm in part.
Since the late 1950s, Edwrard and Helen
Kiholm have operated a small family business which acted as a manufacturer's representative in designated territories of the
mountain west. The business earned commissions from its principal manufacturers
by selling their goods to retailers.
in 1977, the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert
as an independent contractor to handle outside sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the Kiholms intended to retire in ten
years with Mr. Reichert taking over the
business. Mr. Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978 when the business was
incorporated as Regional.
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written employment contract with Regional.
The employment contract contains a non-
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competition ciause restricting Mr. fleicnert
from representing manufacturers represented by Regional or competing with Regional's manufacturers for a three-year period after tne termination of his relationship with Regional. The contract also contains the following damage and attorney
fees provisions central to this appeal
In the event Agent breaches the provisions of this [non-competition] paragraph, all proceeds and benefits derived
therefrom by Agent shall be received and
held by him in trust for Company, and
shall be paid to Company upon demand
by Company.
Agent further agrees to pay Company its
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
which are incurred as a result of his
breach of any provision herein.
On April 30, 1987, the day before a nonjury trial was scheduled before Judge
Leonard H. Russon and more than three
years after Mr. Reichert's original answer
and counterclaim had been filed, Mr. Reichert filed an amendment to his counterclaim. In this amendment, Mr. Reichert
claimed Regional owed him commissions
and salary from 1977 through 1983. Judge
Russon struck the amendment. On May
26, 1987, after Judge Russon had recused
himself at Mr. Reichert's request, and a
mistrial had been granted, Mr. Reichert
filed a written motion to amend his counterclaim again asserting a claim for commissions and wages. The motion was denied by Judge Pat B. Brian.
At trial it was undisputed that after Mr.
Reichert left Regional in 1983, he continued
to represent three manufacturers whom he
had previously represented as a salesman
for Regional: Artfaire, Carousel Party Favors, Inc., and Atlas Textiles. He received
commissions of $42,176.09 from these manufacturers in the three-year period after
his relationship with Regional ended.
1. In its brief, Regional complains about several
issues being submitted to the jury and the
court's decision not to direct a verdict. Specifically, Regional claims (1) there was insufficient
evidence to submit to the jury the question of
whether the 1979 agreement was intended to
have legal effect, and (2) the court should have

In defense of his
ciaimed tne written
13. 1979. was never
force or effect. He
represented that it
dressing" to protect
tax audit.

actions. Mr. R,eichert
agreement of August
intended to nave any
insisted tnai Kegiona,
was merely "window
Regional in case of a

The jury found the 1979 employment
agreement was enforceable and neither
party has appealed this issue.1 However,
the jury only awarded Regional $792.IS m
damages.
The parties stipulated that evidence supporting reasonable attorney fees as provided for by the employment agreement would
be submitted to the judge by affidavit following the jury verdict. Counsel for Regional submitted a lengthy affidavit detailing $26,740.50 in fees. No opposing affidavit was submitted by Mr. Reichert. The
court, without giving any explanation,
awarded Regional $7,500 in fees.
The issues we address in this appeal are:
(1) whether Regional should have a new
trial on the issue of damages; (2) whether
the judge abused his discretion in reducing
Regional's attorney fees; and (3) whether
the trial court erred in denying Mr. Reichert's motion to amend his counterclaim to
add a claim for unpaid commissions and
salary.
I. DAMAGES
Regional challenges the jury's damage
award claiming it is contrary to the unambiguous terms of the parties' non-competition agreement which provides a formula to
calculate damages. Regional claims the
inadequate damage award is a result of the
trial court improperly instructing the jury
on the issue of damages.
The provisions of the 1979 agreement
dealing with damages at issue on appeal
provide:
directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the
issue of liability. However, since the jury decided the issue of enforceability of the contract in
Regional's favor, we do not consider these arguments. Whatever error may have occurred was
harmless.

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY. INC. % REICHERT
Ciis a* 7S4 J\2d 121V f\ ah 4pp

At no nine during tne term of this
agreement, or within a period o: tnree
years following the termination of
Agent s employment snail Agent [Reichen], for himself or m behalf of any
other person, firm, partnership or corporation totner than the Company [Regional] ; represent any Principal of company
for the purpose of selling any of their
products
Because a breach of this provision will
result in irreparable damages which are
difficult to measure . . . Company at its
election shall be entitled to an injunction
restraining Agent from breaching the
terms of this provision.
In the event Agent breaches the provisions of this paragraph, all proceeds and
benefits derived therefrom from agent
shall be received and held by him in trust
for company, and shall be paid to company upon demand by company.
In the first instance, the determination of
whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law. Wilbum v. Interstate
Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah CtApp.
1988). If the trial court finds the agreement unambiguous and interprets its meaning by examining only the words of the
agreement,
this
interpretation
also
presents a question of law. Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
We thus "accord [the trial court's] construction no particular weight, reviewing
its action under a correctness standard."
Id. The trial court's selection of jury instructions interpreting contractual language also presents a question of law.
"Therefore, we grant no particular deference to the trial court's ruling.,, Ramon v.
Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989).
"Where questions arise in the interpretation of an agreement, the first source of
inquiry is within the document itself. It
should be looked at in its entirety and in
accordance with its purpose. All of its
parts should be given effect insofar as that
is possible." Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Utah CtApp. 1987); see also Larra-
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Ibo, 163 (Utar. 19* '/
f 1, 2] We find tne relevant non-competition ana liquidated damage provisions unambiguous]} provide mat Mr Reicnert was
not to represent any pnncipa of Regions s
for three years following his termination
Mr. Reicnert aamittec at trial that during
his tenure with Regional the company represented Carouse] Products. Atlas Textiles,
anc Artfaire. tnree of P-egional's former
principals as defined by the parties contract. The agreement further provides
that if Mr. Reichert does represent any of
Regional's principals, then he will hold all
commissions earned as a result of this prohibited representation in trust for Regional. Regional relied on this contractual language and introduced evidence that Mr.
Reichert collected $42,176.09 in commissions from Carousel, Atlas, and Artfaire
during the three years following his termination.
Regional requested the following instruction reflecting its theory that the contract
provided a formula for determining damages based on these earnings in violation of
the contract:
Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to any other damages it may prove
by a preponderance of the evidence, all
commissions received by defendant during the years 1984, 1985, and 1986 from
Artfaire, Carousel Party Favors, Inc.,
and Atlas Textiles.
This instruction was refused by the trial
court. The court substituted the following
instruction on damages:
Where the parties agree on a method
of establishing damages for breach of
contract, the agreement is enforceable if
it is designed to provide fair compensation for the breach, based upon a reasonable relation to actual damages.
Regional claims the instruction given is
contrary to Utah law. In Young Electric
Sig?i Co. v. United Standard West, Inc..
755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court considered a liquidated damage provision in a contract. The court reversed the trial court which had required
the plaintiff to prove actual damages to

1214

Utah

n\

PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES

validate the liquidated damage provision.
Tne court stated
[A]s a general rule, parties to a contract
may agree to liquidated damages m the
case of a breach, and such agreements
are enforceaDle if the amount of liquidated damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the possible compensatory
damages and does not constitute a forfeiture or a penalty. Reasonable liquidated
damages provisions may reduce the cost
of litigation by obviating the expense
entailed in proving actual damages. If a
liquidated damages provision is enforceable, a plaintiff need not prove actual
damages. The burden is on the party
who would avoid a liquidated damages
provision to prove that no damages were
suffered or that there is no reasonable
relationship between compensatory and
liquidated damages.
Id. at 164 (citations omitted); see also Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah
1982).
The instruction given by the trial court in
this case, in effect, put the burden on Regional to establish that the liquidated damages provision of the agreement provided
fair compensation for Mr. Reichert's
breach and the resulting damages awarded
were reasonably related to the actual damages suffered by Regional. This is contrary to Utah law.
Even if the instruction could be read to
put the burden on Mr. Reichert to show no
damages were suffered or there was no
reasonable relationship between the actual
damages Regional suffered and the $42,176.09 it would collect under the agreement, there was insufficient evidence introduced below to enable the jury to find
either proposition. Mr. Reichert did not
establish that the $42,176.09 in commissions awarded under the liquidated damage
provision would be disproportionate to the
amount of damage Regional suffered by its
loss of commissions from three of its former principals. On appeal, Mr. Reichert
does not point to any evidence offered be2. The only evidence alluded to by Mr. Reichert
is evidence establishing certain unpaid commissions. This evidence was not admitted on the
issue of damaces hut was snerifir-allv rpstrirtpd

low to snow tna: iht liquidated Damages
provision was unreasonable nor Goes hv
compare the liauiaateo damages to tne actual damages suffered DY Regional.1
We cannot say that a provision wmcr
returns the commission? lost for a threeyear period as a result cf the breach of i
non-competition agreement is unreasonable
as a matter of lav. Aitnougn this liquidated damages formula does not reflect
expenses incurred by Mr. Reichert in earning the commissions, it is limited to three
years. Regional's loss of profits as a result of its permanent loss of three of its
principals to Mr. Reichert could certainly
have exceeded a three-year period and thus
the liquidated damages provided by application of the contractual provision.
We believe the jury verdict was a result
of improper instruction and the admission
of evidence on the issue of commissions
which Mr. Reichert claimed were owing
him. This testimony was received over objection and the trial court limited its application to the issue of the enforceability of
the 1979 agreement. Nevertheless, this evidence undoubtedly further confused the
jury. This evidence on unpaid commissions
would be inadmissible on retrial on the
limited issue of damages under the contractual damages provision.
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse
and remand for a new trial on the issue of
damages consistent with the legal principles stated herein.
II. ATTORNEY FEES
In Utah, litigants can recover attorney
fees only if they are authorized by statute
or provided for by contract. Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah
1988) (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v.
Mantasf 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985);
Turtle Management,
Inc. v. Haggis
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah
1982)); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56
(1987). Moreover, "[i]f provided for by
to the issue of the enforceability of the 1979
contract, and is legally irrelevant to the damages provision at issue.

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY. INC. K REICHERT
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contract, tne aware of attorney fees is al- Inc. 74£ P.2d H>C7 106* iLtar. 1^87
lowed only m accordance witn the terms of However where parties tu a cor*tract agree
the contract " Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2c tnat attorney lees win ot awarded, trios
at 988 (citing Trcuner v Gushing, 688 P.2d attorney fees provisions snouic or«iinanr
856, 858 (Utah 1984})- sec aisu Turtle bt enforced by tne court. Cooaoc i. Crav
Management. Inc., 645 P.2d at 6"1. L & M ford, 780 p.2a 834 iC t.Ati,.19^
Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 44b. 450 (Utah
An award of attorney fees must be basec
1984K
on evidence m tne recorc which supports
[3] In the present case, the contract of the aware. See Bange^ie^ t. Pouhon. 6^-:
P.2d 100. 103 (Utah 198c > However, a
the parties proviaes
trial
court is not compel lee to accept tne
Agent [Reichert] . . . agrees to pay Company [Regional] its reasonable attorney's self-serving testimony of a party requestfees and costs which are incurred as a ing attorney fees even if there is no opposresult of his breach of any provision ing testimony. See Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1978). A
herein.
The parties stipulated at trial that, if the court can evaluate the fees requested and
jury found for Regional on the enforceabili- determine a lesser amount is reasonable
ty of the contract, the court would deter- under the circumstances. See Dixie State
mine the appropriate award of attorney Bank, 764 P.2d at 989. Several practical
fees. Following trial, counsel for Regional factors to consider in determining a reasonsubmitted an affidavit supporting his fees able attorney fee are
the difficulty of the litigation, the effidetailed by a computer accounting of the
ciency of the attorneys in presenting the
hours worked and tasks accomplished on
case, the reasonableness of the number
RegionaPs behalf. Regional claimed it had
of
hours spent on the case, the fee cusincurred a total of $26,740.50 in attorney
tomarily
charged in the locality7 for simfees and costs of $610.46. Counsel for
ilar services, the amount involved in the
Regional also testified that the fees were
case and the result attained, and the
reasonable considering the nature and exexpertise and experience of the attorneys
tent of the work performed. Mr. Reichert
involved.
made no objection to the affidavit nor did
he offer opposing testimony on the issue of Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625
reasonable attorney fees. The court made (Utah 1985); see also Dixie State Bank,
no findings of fact nor conclusions of law 764 P.2d at 989.
on the issue of attorney fees but simply
We have consistently encouraged trial
entered an order awarding $7,500 in fees to courts to make findings to explain the
Regional.
factors which they considered relevant in
[4] It is generally within the trial arriving at an attorney fee award. See,
court's discretion to determine the reason- e.g., Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 624. Findings
able attorney fees which should be award- are particularly important when the evied and we will not overturn the award dence on attorney fees is in dispute or the
absent an abuse of discretion. See Dixie trial court has reduced the attorney fees
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; Jenkins v. from those requested and supported by unBailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984); Tur- disputed evidence. Id.
tle Management, Inc., 645 P.2d at 671.
We have recently held that a trial court
We "will presume that the discretion of the abuses its discretion in awarding less than
trial court was properly exercised unless the amount of attorney fees requested
the record clearly shows the contrary." when there is adequate and uncontroverted
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 evidence in the record to support those fees
(Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rel. Road unless the court offers an explanation for
Comm'n v. General Oil Co., 22 Utah 2d the reduction considering the factors previ60. 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968)). See also ously discussed.
Sec Martindale
v.
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah Ct.App.
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1989); see also Dine State Bank. 764 P.2d
at 987-91.
In this case, the trial court substantially
reduced tfte attorney fee? requested from
$26,740.50 to $7,500 even though the record
contained undisputed testimony delineating:
the services performed and tnat the rate
and time expended were reasonable and
necessary The trial court made no findings or explanation for its sua sponte reduction.
Mr. Reichert argues that the court's reduction of fees was proper because the
fees were incurred as a result of Regional's
unsuccessful attempt to secure an injunction. Unfortunately, the trial court made
no such finding. Because the trial court
gave no explanation for its reduction of
attorney fees, we reverse the award and
remand for the trial court to enter the
amount supported by the undisputed evidence or alternatively to make findings to
support the reduction consistent with the
authority cited herein.
III. DENIAL OF MR. REICHERT'S
MOTION TO AMEND
[5] On April 30, 1987, three years after
commencement of the litigation and following extensive discovery, Mr. Reichert filed
an "Amendment to Counterclaim" seeking
judgment against Regional for "all commissions, compensation, wages and salary
found to be due and owing" for the years
1977 through 1983. A non-jury trial was
scheduled for the next day. The trial court
struck the attempted amendment. After
the trial commenced, Mr. Reichert moved
to recuse the assigned trial judge. Judge
Russon declared a mistrial and the case
was reassigned to Judge Brian who denied
a subsequent, identical motion to amend
filed by Mr. Reichert. The propriety of the
trial court's denial of Mr. Reichert's amendment must be measured against Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), which
states:
A party may amend his pleading once as
a matter of course any time before a
responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar . . . otherwise, a party may

amenc nit pieadmg on»y b\ leave cf
court or by written consent of tne aoverse party anc leave shah be ireel\
given when justice so requires
Tiit decision to allow ar. amendment i*
discretionary witr, the trial court a? pan <?:
its auty to manage proceedings beiow T^ *
win not disturb a trial court s aecis^or absent an abuse of discretion See Girarc i
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
Chadunck v Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817. 820
(Utah Ct.App.1988); Tripp i. Vaughn, 746
P.2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
In analyzing the grant or denial of a
motion to amend, Utah courts have focused
on three factors: the timeliness of the motion; the justification given by the movant
for the delay; and the resulting prejudice
to the responding party. See Tripp, 746
P.2d at 797.
[6] Appellate courts have upheld a trial
court's denial of a motion to amend where
the amendment is sought late in the course
of the litigation, where there is no adequate explanation for the delay, and where
the movant was aware of the facts underlying the proposed amendment long before
its filing. Imperial Enter., Inc. v. Fireman 's Fund Ins., 535 F.2d 287, 293 (5th
Cir.1976); Girard, 660 P.2d at 248; Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94
(Utah 1983).
Rule 13(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure focuses on the moving party's
responsibility to articulate reasons for the
delay: "When a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice
requires, he may by leave of court set up
the counterclaim by amendment." Without
such justification,
[t]he amendment of pleadings on the eve
of trial causes great disruption to the
legal process and is unfair to an opponent who has conducted discovery, fully
prepared the case, and scheduled trial
time based on the moving party's prior
pleadings.
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820.
Courts have also found it important
when denying a motion to amend that new

KETCHUM. KONKEL, ET AL. ^. HERITAGE ^MT.
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causes of action or issues are added with
consequent disadvantage to the responding
party. Girard, 660 P.2d at 248.
In his brief. Mr. Reichert alleges the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to
aliow his amendment because the issues
presented did not substantially vary the
issues and evidence already involved in the
case. We disagree. The issues raised by
Regional's complaint were limited to the
validity of the parties' contract, particularly its non-competition clause and Mr. Reichert's alleged breach of the non-competition clause. The counterclaim interjected
the issue of commissions due and paid to
Mr. Reichert for a six-year period involving
an analysis and accounting of sales figures
not previously at issue.
Mr. Reichert made his first attempt to
amend his counterclaim on the day before
the trial was scheduled to commence and
more than three years after his original
answer was filed. Mr. Reichert offered no
justification for his delay in asserting his
claim for unpaid commissions.3
Thus, Mr. Reichert, on the eve of trial,
attempted to insert new issues in the case
without giving any adequate explanation
for his delay. We believe this amendment
would have prejudiced Regional. On the
facts before us and under the authority
previously discussed, we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the
amendment.
In summary, we reverse and remand on
the issue of damages and attorney fees,
but affirm the trial court's denial of Mr.
Reichert's attempt to amend his counterclaim.
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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3. Later in the proceedings, Mr. Reichert again
tried to add his claim for unpaid commissions
by filing a Motion to Amend his counterclaim.
This motion, also made without justification,
violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 (1989),
which provides:
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Architects which held mechanics' liens
filed actions to foreclose liens. Construction lender moved for partial summary
judgment claiming its trust deed had priority over ail mechanics' liens on property.
The Fourth District Court, Utah County,
George E. Ballif, J., ruled in favor of construction lender.
Architects appealed.
The Court of Appeals. Billings, J., held
that: (1) off-site preliminary architectural
work did not constitute * 'commencement of
work" for priority purposes under mechanics' lien statute; (2) postforeclosure pretrust deed surveying, staking and soil testing work did not qualify as "commencement of work"; (3) foreclosure on fee property extinguished unrecorded liens on property including mechanics' liens; however,
foreclosure did not extinguish liens on
leased and permit properties; and (4) remand was required on issue of whether
there was material abandonment of project
which would have required commencement
If an application for an order, made to a
judge of a court in which the action or proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in
part, or is granted conditionally, no subsequent application for the same order can be
made to any other judge ..

Chapter
1. Interest.
6. Prompt Payment Aci.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section
15-1-1.

Interest rates — Contracted rate —
Legal rate.

15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate.
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1;
L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981,
ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6; 1989, ch. 79,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, redesignated

former Subsection (2) as Subsection (1) and
added "that is the subject of their contract" at
the end of the subsection; designated the first
and second sentences of former Subsection (1)
as Subsections (2) and (3); and made stylistic
changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
that the lease was entered into, not the rate in
effect on the date that the damages occurred.
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d
105 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Damages for breach of contract.
Determination of damages.
Determining interest rate.
Federal court.
—Federal question.
Cited.
Damages for breach of contract
Interest allowed on damages for breach of
contract under a lease should be governed by
the statutory interest rate in effect on the date

Determination of damages.
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate if the
damages cannot be determined with mathematical precision. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnel, Inc., 784 P.2d 475
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Determining interest rate.
The statutory legal rate of interest is applied

205

Iron: trie C£tc pcyn;er.i if: sue t-c- trie ;u^^:.en:
date. Davief v. CLsor., 74f P.2d 264 'ir,.^:. Ct
App. 19^-7
Where Juiy 7. 1961. the date defenaar.:
signed the settlement statement, was tnt aui
aate, as mat was tne date the benen: wa* cor;ferred anc it was aisc or, this date that deiendams acknowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs for their services in constructing duplexes.
the appropriate rate of interest was 10 percent.
Davies v. Oison, 746 P.2d 264 -Utah Ct. App
1987).

A lecera; court •:- :•,:.:
interest rate of tnt io:
Question case, sue:, ai
federal Q u i e t Tn i t Ac; Tr;t court, me-refjre.
s houic appiy feaera, common iaw m *etnn* tne
preyjderneni interest ratt. Amoco Prod. Co. v.
United States. 663 ?. Stipp 998 T>. Utar.
19S7
Cited m Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works.
Inc., 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 -Ct. App. 1990;.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Usury
Implications Of Alternative Mortgage Instruments: The Uncertainty In Calculating Permissible Returns, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1105.

A.L.R. — Prejudgment interest awards in
divorce cases, 62 A.L.R.4th 156.

15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Discretion of trial court.
Cited.
Discretion of trial court.
A judgment for child support arrearages is a
judgment under this section. The custodial
spouse is entitled to the statutory rate of interest on the judgment until payment in full. Although the trial court may, in its discretion
under § 30-3-5, raise the statutory interest if

equity so requires, the court does not have the
discretion to lower, stav. or waive interest.
S t r o u d v Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), afTd, 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988).
'
w
Clted m
Marchant v. Marchant. /43 P.2d
199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn,
747 P.2c 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Gleave v.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Ct. App.
1988); Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

CHAPTER 2
LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN
15-2-1. Period of minority.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Balls v. Hackley, 745 P.2d 836
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages for breach of contractDebts overdue.
Determination of earning power of money
Eminent domain.
Installments.
Pawnbrokers and money lenders.
School districts.
Unconscionability.
Damages for breach of contract.
Eight percent interest is not allowable on
damages recovered in action for breach of contract; only 6% (now 10%) is allowable. Salt
Lake Wet Wash Laundry v. Colorado Animal
Bv-Products Co., 104 Utah 385, 140 P.2d 344
(1943).
Debts overdue.
In Utah, interest is allowed on debts overdue, even in absence of statute or contract providing therefor. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586 (1890),
aff d, 151 U.S. 317, 14 S. Ct 348, 38 L. Ed. 177
(1894).
Determination of earning power of money.
This rate cannot be used as a basis of arriving at the reasonable earning power of money,
in estimating damages plaintiff is entitled to in
action for personal injuries. Klinge v. Southern
Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P.2d 367, 105 A.L.R.
204 (1936).
Eminent domain.
A condemnee is entitled to interest at the
rate of only 6% (now 10%) from the date of an
order of immediate occupancy to the date of
judgment. State ex rel. Road Comm. v.
Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P.2d 900 (1952).

Installments.
Defaulting maker on installment note was
liable for interest on sums in default at rate of
8% (now 10%), as fixed by this section. Jensen
v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036
(1915).
Pawnbrokers and money lenders.
So far as § 7-8-3, industrial loans, conflicted
with this section and chapter it would prevail,
for the former legislation was a special and
subsequent act, and repealed "all laws in conflict" therewith. People's Fin. & Thrift Co. v.
Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 P. 304 (1930).
School districts.
School district, where it has received the
benefit of goods, should pay the legal rate of
interest from the date it received the benefit of
its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark
Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764 (1919).
Unconscionability.
Where one loaning money had received the
full amount of money loaned and interest
amounting to 15% per annum, the debt was
held fully paid, and the lender could not recover anything in addition. Carter v. West, 38
Utah 381, 113 P. 1025 (1910).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and
Usury § 63 et seq.
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 32.
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of disclosure statutes requiring one extending credit or
making loan to give statement showing terms
as to amounts involved and charges made, 14
A.L.R.3d 330.

Validity and construction of provision (escalator clause) in land contract or mortgage that
rate of interest payable shall increase if legal
rate is raised, 60 A.L.R.3d 473.
Compensation for interest prepayment penalty in eminent domain proceedings, 84
A.L.R.3d 946.
Key Numbers. — Interest *» 29.
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4Z-z*-c**. Inherent risks of skiing — irail board? lis ring
inherent risks and limitations on liability.
5k- area operators shall DOST irail boards at one or more promirer,: »:>c3:icri*
wiinin each ski area which -shall include a list of me inherent r:sK= o: 5r~::r_~.
and the limitations on liability of sk; area operators, as defined in tins act
History; L. 1979. ch. 166. $ 4.
Meaning of fttrus act". — See note following same catchiine in notes to > 78-27-51.

78-27-55.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch.
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980. ch. 43. § 1.

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith.
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Without merit" and "good faith."
A frivolous action having no basis in law or
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief

that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983),

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593.
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
state statute or rule subjecting party making
untrue allegations or denials to payment of
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209.

Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action. 44 A.L.R.4th 776.
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for statecourt award. 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Award of counsel fees to prevailing partyVj&*ed OTV adversary's had faith, obduracv. or
o t h e r misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833.

78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover
attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 2*8, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
434

History: C. -35S. ? £-27-.!>£.£.ftTia-.'Vfdby L.
1986, eh. 79. ? 1.

7S-27-57.

Attorney's fees awarded to state funded agency
in action against state or subdivision — Forfeii of
appropriated monies.

Any agency or organization receiving stale funds which, as a result of its
suing the state, or political subdivision thereof, receives attorney's fees and
costs as all or pan of a settlement or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund,
from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received.
History: L. 1981, ch. 155, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.

78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons other than
law enforcement officers.
Persons who are not peace officers, constables, sheriffs, or lawfully appointed deputies of such officers or authorized state investigators in counties
of 400,000 persons or more are not entitled to serve any forms of civil or
criminal process other than complaints, summonses, and subpoenas.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-58, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 173, § 1.

78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters.
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any person which
provides shelter, food, clothing, or other products or services without consideration to indigent persons.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient shelters, owners,
operators, and employees of transient shelters, and persons who contribute
products or services to transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages
or injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured person's use of
the products or services provided by the transient shelter.
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person for damages or
injury intentionally caused by that person or resulting from his gross negligence.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-59, enacted bv L.
1986, ch. 179, § 1.
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A.L.R. — Cred:: czrc :s?ue-t iia&lLr
der siate ifiw? i:<r wrcngiV b.Ainz car:
tion. dishonor, or aisciosurt. li A.L.E 4ir.

78-27-50. Financial information privacy — Act inapplicable to certain official investigations.
Nothing in this act shall apply where an examination of said records is a
part of an official investigation by any local police, sheriff, city attorney,
county attorney, the attorney general, the Department of Public Safety, the
Office of Recovery Services of the Department of Human Services, or the
Department of Commerce.
Historv: L. 1979, ch. 166. § 1; 1990, ch.
133, § 18; 1990, ch. 183, § 57.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 133. effective April 23. 1990, substituted "the Department of Public Safety, the
Bureau of Recovery Services of the Department of Human Services, or the Department of
Commerce" for "or the state Department of
'Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery Services, Department of Social Services."

The 1990 amendment by ch. 183, effective
April 23. 1990. substituted "Office of Recovery
Services. Department of Human Services" for
"bureau of Recovery Services. Department of
Social Services."
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Ski resort's liability for skier's injuries resulting from condition of ski run or
slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632.

78-27-56, Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988. ch. 92,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not
otherwise provided by statute or agreement"

following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); substituted "shall" for "may" following "the court"
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsection (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added
Subsection (2?.
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Breacn of covenan* of gooc ia;tr. D* insurer
Discretion of covin,
Findings

Hearing
Staie of mind
Cited
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not
show the bad faith necessary for an award under this section. Canvon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
Discretion of court.
It is within the trial court's discretion to determine bad faith under this section. Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah
1989).
Findings.
Under this section, a trial court must make
findings that: (1) the claim or claims were
"without merit," and (2) the party did not act
in good faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Hearing
This sect)on aoes not reauire a tna* court u
hold a hearse to aetermme if £ parr* na^ bee"stubborn]} litigious" or if an action \*as witnoui merit Canyon County Store v Brace>, 751
P.2d 414 .Utah 1989,
State of mind.
The existence of bad faith, which must be
shown under this section, is a subjective question of state of mind. Canvon County Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101
(Utah 1987): Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d
1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush,
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987): DeBry v
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank. 754 P.2d
60 (Utah 1988): Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770
P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Regional Sales
Agencv, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989\

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342.

Note, 'The Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah,'*
1989 Utah L. Rev. 571.

78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover
attorney's fees.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d
1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Attorney's liability under state
law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56
A.L.R.4th 486.
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